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Abstract. The risk-based approach (RBA) provides certain advantages in the 
construction and operation of information security management systems, there-
fore, the most frequently applied standards in this area are based on it. But the 
practical application of RBA for protection against cyber threats is fraught with 
a number of difficulties and limits. It is shown that application of a detailed risk 
assessment  to assess the information security in  organization intensively using 
the Internet and other IT in its activities, require a lengthy work to investigate 
vulnerabilities, calculating the private risks, reducing them into risks of threat. 
Taking into account the extremely high labor costs of this procedure, it is rele-
vant to solve the problem by assessing high-level risks. Four verbal specifica-
tions of the attacker are introduced, describing various aspects of his behavior 
and skills, the socio-psychological context of his actions, the target settings of 
these actions, affecting the choice of the attacker's strategy, methods and ways 
to implement information threats. On the basis of these specifications reflexive 
risk models are formed. These are mathematical models whose structure and 
parameters reflect the characteristics of the attacker contained in its specifica-
tion. Each of these models can be tailored to its own security policy to minimize 
losses to the organization. The study of reflexive models in a number of cases 
made it possible to determine the maximum volume of investments in the in-
formation security system and reveal the limitations in the application of the 
RBA to the construction of the information security system. 
Keywords: risk-based approach, investments, reflexive risk models, hacker, in-
formation security, information security system. 
1 Introduction 
In modern society, information is one of the basic resources, the need to protect of 
which is recognized by the overwhelming majority of business entities. In these con-
ditions, issues related to the protection of information that may be of interest to poten-
tial competitors, insiders, intruders, etc. are especially relevant. Taking into account 
the specifics of information resources, including the difficulties arising when trying to 
evaluate them, as well as the limited financial resources, there is a need for an ade-
quate assessment of the level of reasonable investments in the information security 
system of organizations that can be determined based on a risk-based approach. 
Currently, there are some numbers of regulatory documents governing information 
security issues. They are the basis for creating systems for assessing both information 
risk and information security as a whole. The results of information risk evaluating 
affect the amount of funds invested in information security systems, therefore, one of 
the important conditions for the normal functioning of these systems is a reliable and 
accessible procedure for analyzing and assessing of information risks. 
The risk-based approach provides certain advantages in the construction and opera-
tion of information security management systems, therefore, the most frequently and 
successfully applied international and industry standards in this area are based on it. 
Unfortunately, the practical application of risk-based approach for protection against 
cyber threats is fraught with a number of difficulties. 
2 Related Works 
Quite a lot of modern scientific papers are devoted to the research of various aspects 
of assessment and risk protection in information systems [1-3]. In particular, existing 
information risk assessment methodologies for identifying information systems 
strengths and weaknesses as well as assessing the information security risk level 
through the fuzzy logic apparatus are analysed in [1]. 
Some academic papers are devoted to deriving an organization’s optimal level of 
information security investment, among which much attention is paid to the Gordon-
Loeb Model (GL Model) and its modifications [4-5]. 
At the heart of the most frequently and successfully applied international and in-
dustry standards for Information security management systems (ISMS) is a risk-based 
approach (RBA), which provides some advantages in the construction and mainte-
nance of those systems. 
RBA is different significantly from the directive approach to building information 
security systems (ISS). The directive approach is based on the use of the recommend-
ed list of potential threats in terms of availability, integrity and confidentiality of in-
formation, which, as a rule, is fully used to form a system of security services when 
building an ISS. In contrast to directive approach, RBA allows highlighting from the 
huge number of existing threats and vulnerabilities of information systems (IS) those 
that are really relevant for the protection of information in a particular organization. 
This creates objective prerequisites for minimizing investment in information securi-
ty. A detailed analysis of the mechanisms for the implementation of the limited range 
of actual threats makes it possible to choose the best methods and means of protection 
that really correspond to the level of protection guarantees. This allows you to form 
objective plans and evaluate investment budgets for the creation of ISS and ISMS. 
The found investment volumes are analyzed from the point of view of the effective-
ness of the information security system, compared with the overall budget of the or-
ganization, etc. Based on the results of the analysis, the initially introduced levels of 
protection guarantees can be revised, corrected, re-planning and budgeting of ISS, i.e. 
the analysis procedure takes on an iterative nature. 
The procedure for identifying a group of threats relevant to information security, 
which is the final stage of the risk assessment process, is called risk prioritization [7]. 
Risks prioritization in any area involves dividing them into levels, for example tolera-
ble, low, medium, high and intolerable risks, which are usually determined based on 
the criteria of likelihood and impact / potential consequence [8; 9] or, for example, 
severity, occurrence and detection [10]. 
Prioritization of information risks, which are caused by the realization of possible 
information threats 𝑡𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 𝑛, involves, firstly, the identification of private risks for 
these threats: 
 
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑝ti𝑞𝑖 ,  (1) 
where 𝑝ti is a quantitative assessment of the likelihood of the implementation of the 
corresponding information threat, and 𝑞𝑖 is an assessment of losses caused by this 
threat. After that, it is required to rank the risks in the resulting set {𝑟𝑖} in descending 
order of their values and to select from the ranked series its left fragment containing 
significant for the organization risks. The threats that generate these risks form the 
group of the required actual threats.  
On the basis of a group of significant risks (i.e. risks of actual threats), the value of 
the integral (generalized) risk 𝑅 is formed. The integral (generalized) risk is calculat-
ed by multiplying the possible losses 𝑄 of the organization, which are the result of the 
combined action of all analysed actual information threats by the probability of these 
losses 𝑃𝑇 , i.e.: 𝑅 = 𝑃𝑇𝑄. Integral risk is a universal indicator of the degree of infor-
mation security, which makes it possible to objectively assess the level of initial 
threats to information processed in the organization's IS, the level of residual threats 
(after building an information security system), and the effectiveness of the infor-
mation security system. The following indicator is used to analyse the effectiveness of 
the information security system: 
 
𝐸 = (𝑅1 − 𝑅𝑇 ) 𝑐⁄ = 𝛥𝑅 𝑐⁄ . (2) 
Here 𝑅1 is the initial value of the integral risk characterizing the possible losses of the 
organization due to the implementation of actual information threats in the absence of 
the information security system, 𝑅𝑇 is the residual value of the organization’s integral 
risk, which estimates possible losses after the introduction of the information security 
system, and 𝛥𝑅 is the amount of possible losses that were prevented due to the estab-
lishment of an information security system in the organization. 
Since the results of risk assessment affect the amount of funds invested in the in-
formation security system, the formation of an understandable and transparent process 
for analyzing information risks is the most important condition for the successful 
functioning of ISMS in the organizations. This also explains the strict requirements 
for the objectivity and accuracy of the calculated risk assessments. 
The procedure for finding the integral risk in some cases may be quite simple. For 
example, subject to the independence and incompatibility of the actual threats and the 
independence of the consequences resulting from their implementation, the integral 
risk corresponds to the total risk 𝑅 = ∑ 𝑟𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . However, for organizations with a rather 
complex structure, having a significant amount of information resources (IR) and 
intensively using complex information technologies in their work, it will be incorrect 
to calculate the integral risk as the total risk. In such cases, the integral risk should be 
calculated taking into account the possibility of the impact of several threats, includ-
ing their joint implementation with the manifestation of interrelated, interdependent 
consequences, which is an extremely nontrivial task [11]. In such conditions the use 
of the total risk as an assessment of the integral risk usually gives a significantly over-
estimated estimate, contributing to an unreasonable increase in the volume of invest-
ments in the construction of ISS. In addition, in formula (1), when calculating private 
risks as values of 𝑝ti and 𝑞𝑖, expert estimates are usually used, which introduces sub-
jective errors into the calculated values, which reduce the reliability of the results of 
subsequent analysis. Another negative aspect of the risk assessment process described 
above is its duration and laboriousness, caused, in particular, by the iterative nature of 
the choice of the structure and configuration of the information security system (tak-
ing into account the need to use the integral risk indicator for each iteration, which 
does not have a general formalized procedure calculation). This approach to assessing 
information risks, due to its labor intensity and duration, is called detailed risk as-
sessment. 
The described above disadvantages of this approach stimulated the development of 
a more general approach called risk assessment of a high-level organization, which is 
given in the current state standards of Ukraine [12; 13]. In this more general ap-
proach, the technological aspects of risk assessment of the organization do not play a 
leading role; in particular, a detailed analysis of IS threats and vulnerabilities is not 
carried out. Instead, the emphasis is on generalized risk scenarios, the degree of de-
pendence of the organization's business on the status of its information assets, in par-
ticular, on the overall level of the organization's investment in information security. 
This approach is focused primarily on solving general strategic aspects of information 
security: organizational, economic as well as basic technical issues. 
 If it is necessary to ensure the safety of especially valuable assets, a detailed risk 
assessment procedure is additionally carried out, which in this case is not iterative in 
nature and does not require the subsequent calculation of the integral risk through a 
set of significant private risks. This approach to risk analysis is called a combined 
approach [12]. It guarantees obtaining a full and technologically completed solution 
to the problem of building the organization's information security system after con-
ducting a high-level risk assessment. 
Note that the goals and methods of using RBA for the analysis and assessment of 
the organization's information security are not defined uniquely, much depends on the 
properties and characteristics of the organization itself. Of particular interest is the 
generalization of the known practical results of the use of RBA for solving infor-
mation security problems, the formalization of procedures in which RBA is the basic 
methodology, the assessment of the prospects of RBA for protecting organizations 
from modern cyber-attacks. 
3 Application of the RBA in the high-level risk assessment 
procedure 
Let's apply RBA to assess the information security in an organization with a fairly 
complex regional structure, having a significant distributed information resource 𝐼, 
intensively using the Internet and other information technologies in its activities. 
A preliminary analysis of possible threats to the information resources of this or-
ganization, carried out using the list of threats given in the ISO / IEC 27005 standard 
[13], allows to claim the following. 
Nine out of 77 threats presented in the list are associated with the impact of natural 
phenomena (climatic, seismic, volcanic, meteorological and flooding), and of an acci-
dental nature (hardware failure and equipment failures, software failures and errors). 
Effective decisions to minimize the risks associated with them can be made immedi-
ately only for these nine threats. 
The remaining 68 threats represent the implementation of deliberate malicious acts 
aimed at information assets. The source of these threats is a person: a malefactor (in-
truder) or a group of malefactors. Note that the same threat can be implemented using 
different attacks (mechanisms) based on the use of various vulnerabilities of infor-
mation systems of organizations. At the same time, the degree of success of the attack 
(i.e. the probable parameter risk) and the level of possible losses of the organization 
directly depend on the potential of the attacker – the competence, resources and moti-
vation of the malicious [14]. 
It is obvious that the application of a detailed risk assessment in this situation will 
require a lengthy and painstaking work to investigate vulnerabilities and enumerate 
the attack mechanisms implemented on their basis, to find out the missing information 
for calculating the private risks of individual attacks, reducing them into risks of 
threat, etc. in accordance with the detailed evaluation procedure outlined above. Its 
intermediate result will be the calculation of a value 𝑅1, a pair of values 𝑅𝑇, 𝛥𝑅 for 
the proposed version of the information security system, evaluating the effectiveness 
of this version of the information security system, making adjustments and changes to 
it (in the mode of possible reusable iteration) and finally determining the acceptable 
(in accordance with the adopted system of criteria) investment amount 𝑐 in the organ-
ization's information security system. 
Taking into account the extremely high labor costs of this procedure, it is relevant 
to solve the problem by assessing high-level risks, excluding the use of an iterative 
procedure as well as without resorting to preliminary calculation of partial risks. It 
should be noted that such solutions have actually already been obtained in [6; 11; 15], 
although the problem statement there was somewhat different. In this regard, in the 
materials presented below, a number of results will be presented only with references 
to paper in which they are given. 
We use the so-called two-factor formula to describe the integral risk: 
 
𝑅 = 𝑃𝑇𝑄. (3) 
where the probability 𝑃𝑇  of occurrence of losses 𝑄 is represented by multiplication 
 
𝑃𝑇 = 𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑣. (4) 
Here 𝑃𝑡 is the likelihood of an attacker’s motivation (his interest in the organization's 
information resource 𝐼, prompting him to commit any attacking actions aimed at this 
resource), 𝑃𝑣 - the likelihood of a successful use of the organization's IS vulnerabili-
ties by an attacker to implement his attacking actions. Structuring the probability 𝑃𝑇  is 
convenient in that the probability of motivation 𝑃𝑡 is actually determined only by the 
level of interest of the attacker to the information resource of the organization, which 
makes it expedient to find this probability in the form of a single expert assessment. 









where 𝑔 is the value of the resource 𝐼 for the malefactor (attacker), 𝐷 is the general-
ized costs of preparing and implementing attacking actions by the attacker, presented 
in a monetary form, 𝑔 − 𝐷 is the attacker's net profit in the case of a successful attack. 
Obviously, the higher is 𝑔, the closer to 1 the probability 𝑃𝑡. With a decrease 𝑔, in the 
case 𝑔 ≤ 𝐷 the attack becomes meaningless, unless the interests of the attacker go 
beyond commercial gain.  
It should also be noted that there are two features that are important for the practi-
cal application of formula (5): the parameters included in expression (5) are deter-
mined only by the interests and motives of the attacker's behavior; the perceptions of 
the value of the same information resource by the attacking and defending sides is 
generally different – “asymmetric” [11; 15; 16]. For example, for the owner of a re-
source, its value 𝑞 is usually calculated based on an analysis of the cost aspects of 
creating this resource, the calculation procedure is often typified, and the obtained 
estimates are quite stable. For the attacking side, the value 𝑔 of the "extracted" infor-
mation is formed on the basis of the market value of the resource and the number of 
potential buyers wishing to get it in their property. Thus, 𝑔 ≠ 𝑞. 
The probability of a successful attack 𝑃𝑣 is determined by the ratio of the potentials 
of the attacking and defending sides and can be represented by a next heuristic equa-
tion: 
 






where c is the total volume of investments in the organization's information security, 
μ = g q⁄  is the coefficient of asymmetry in the perception of the value of information 
by the attacking and protecting sides, s is the coefficient that determines the level of 
efficiency of investments c in the information security: subject to the same investment 
volume c, the higher the value s, the lower the probability value Pv. The value of the 
coefficient s depends on the organization's attitude to information security issues and 
is determined by the level of maturity of the organization in the field of information 
security management. It is possible to obtain a quantitative (point) assessment of the 
level of maturity by applying the methodology described in [7] for self-assessment of 
the level of maturity of the risk management system in an organization. The score 
found by this method should be used as the desired value. The maximum possible 
value corresponds to 85 points, a high level of maturity of the organization is charac-
terized by a range of 51 to 85 points. 
It’s obviously if an information resource I is not interesting for an attacker, in this 
case g → 0, the coefficient μ → 0 as well as probability of a successful attack Pv → 0. 
On the contrary, if the resource I is of no value to the organization owner, there are 
practically no investments in the information security system (c = 0), and Pv = 1. 
Finally, if the attacker is extremely interested in the resource I and is ready to receive 
it at practically unlimited costs, in this case → ∞ , Pv = 1. 
Substitution of expressions (5), (6) into formula (3) makes it possible to construct a 
formalized generalized model of integral risk 
 









in which the value 𝑐 is included as one of the parameters, and then make in general 
form the dependence of the prevented losses 𝛥𝑅(𝑐) on the level of investment in the 
organization's information security system. 
To conduct research within the framework of a high-level risk analysis, we will de-
fine the concept of the organization's information security system efficiency. We will 
assume that the fulfillment of the condition 𝛥𝑅(𝑐) >𝑐 is obligatory for an effective 
ISS. Then we will consider the most effective ISS for which the difference 𝛥𝑅(𝑐) −
𝑐 = 𝛥с(𝑐), representing the "net profit" due to the construction of the ISS, seems to be 





where С is the set of values 𝑐 for which 𝛥𝑅(𝑐) >𝑐. Unfortunately, the use of the gen-
eralized integral risk model (8) does not allow finding 𝑐eff explicitly in the analytical 
form. However, in a number of cases, applying a more detailed description of the 
capabilities and properties of the attacking side, the motivational and economic as-
pects of its behavior, it turns out to be real to obtain an analytical solution to the opti-
mization problem (8) and much information that complements this solution. 
4 Reflexive risk models 
Now we will consider four verbal specifications of the attacker, reflecting various 
aspects of the behavior and preparation of the attacker, social and psychological con-
text of its actions, the existing (often prescriptively determined) target settings for 
these actions, which largely affect the choice of an attack strategy, methods and ways 
of information threats implementing. According to the introduced specifications, re-
flexive risk models are formed. Each model has certain features depending on the 
characteristics of the attacker. 
 
4.1 Specification 1. Script kiddie (newbie, lamer)  
The attackers are inexperienced persons that do not have main skills in information 
security system. They often lack the sufficient knowledge to write an exploit or their 
own program, so they use scripts or software developed by others [17; 18]. Script 
kiddies usually do not understand the mechanism of attack action as well as have little 
idea of it potentially consequences. They are not capable of independently implement-
ing effective attack solutions because have lack of experience and financial resource. 
The purpose of script kiddies can be to impress their peers, to have fun, to be accepted 
by "serious" hackers group [18]. Nevertheless, some researchers and practitioners in 
the field of information security consider that script kiddies can cause significant 
damage to the ISS: they are very numerous and some of them are quite stubborn and 
persistent in their attempts to implement the attack. In particular, Lloyd Borrett, notes 
that an increasing number of script kiddies are motivated by the opportunity to make 
money, because the cost of simple hacking scripts is relatively low.  
Since script kiddies are the most common type of intruder, the need to protect 
against it is a top priority when building an information security system It should be 
emphasized that the "old", unoriginal threats implemented by script kiddies can cause 
very significant damage to the organization if it does not pay due attention to protect-
ing your information. In addition, it should be noted that script kiddie community is 
not homogeneous, and those of them who have gotten a good education and are able 
to learn can become advanced cybercriminals. 
In general, we will assume that the following conclusion is true regarding script 
kiddies. First, the attacking activity of script kiddies is not purposeful, the objects of 
their attacks are random computers, and various random information (although some-
times very valuable) falls into the hands of the attacker. In this regard, their motiva-
tion is extremely unstable and spontaneous so formula (5) is not relevant for script 
kiddies. Second, the script kiddies are not able to independently develop the means 
and new attack mechanisms, moreover, they do not understand the mechanism of 
action of the old ones, basing their actions in the implementation of threats mainly on 
the application of the enumeration principle. Therefore, the basic level of security, 
which is competently embodied in the organization's information security system, 
focused on the use of means and methods of protection against already known "old" 
threats, is quite effective for countering attacks by the script kiddies. 






where the probability of a successful use of an organization's IS vulnerabilities by an 






It follows from (10) that the information security in an organization primarily depends 
on internal parameters: the amount of investments 𝑐 in the ISS, the level of organiza-
tion maturity (determined by the value of the parameter 𝑠) and the value 𝑞 of its in-
formation resource. An increase of the values 𝑐 and 𝑠 leads to a decrease in the values 
of probability (10). 
Having calculated for the reflexive risk model (9) the value of prevented losses 
𝛥𝑅(𝑐) and, compared it with the volume of investments 𝑐 in the information security 
system, we find the "net profit" of the organization due to the construction of the ISS: 
 
𝛥с(𝑐) = 𝛥𝑅(𝑐) − 𝑐 =
sc
𝑞+sc
𝑃𝑡𝑞 − с, (11) 
Analysis of expression (11) allows determining [6; 11] the range of "reasonable" in-
vestments 0 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑞(𝑠 − 1 ) 𝑠⁄  within which 𝛥𝑅(𝑐) >𝑐. Here is the formula for cal-





(√𝑃𝑡𝑠 − 1), (12) 
as well as formulas for calculating the value of the probability . 𝑃𝑣 and risk 𝑅 under 









Within the range of "reasonable" investments, the dependence of the values of the 
effective volume of investments 𝑐eff on the parameter 𝑠 has a one-extreme character 
with a maximum:  max[𝑐eff(𝑠)] = 0,25qP𝑡 [11, 15]. Obviously, the largest value of 
effective investments in ISS will be at 𝑃𝑡 = 1, while the maximum investment in ISS 
will be 𝑐effmax = 0,25𝑞, i.e. 25% of the cost of the resource 𝑞, which is the object of 
protection. For highly effective security solutions (for example, 𝑠 = 60) in accord-
ance with formula (12), even with 𝑃𝑡 = 1, the volume of investments in the ISS can 
be at the level of 11-13% of the cost of the protected resource. The obtained results 
are in good agreement with the empirical estimates of the volume of investments giv-
en in a number of publications the authors of which focus on the amount of 15-20% 
of the value of IS assets. 
It should be noted that as well as script kiddie the various network infections and 
worms, excluding zero-day attacks, can be successfully eliminated at the basic level 
of protection. 
 
4.2 Specification 2. Professional Hacker 
The attacker is represented by a professional or a group of professionals with the nec-
essary knowledge, skills and sufficient experience, for which hacking is the main 
activity of a frankly commercial nature. A professional hacker usually has some fi-
nancial and economic resources, but for him, nevertheless, the limitation 𝐷 ≤ 𝑔 re-
mains quite relevant. If the cost of the information resource 𝐼 is estimated by the sides 
of the attack and defense approximately the same, i.e. the asymmetry coefficient 
𝜇 = 1, the reflexive risk model for this case will be as follows: 
 









The research of formula (14) for 𝐷 = 0 allows to estimate the boundary values of the 
range of reasonable investments: 0 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑞. With increasing values of 𝐷, for 
𝐷 → 0,25sqP𝑡




  for 𝐷 = 0,25sqP𝑡
2. In this ultimate case, the largest investment in the 
information security system will be 𝑐effmax = 0,5𝑞, i.e. 50% of the cost of the resource 
𝑞 [11, 15]. The expenditure of this volume of investments requires an analysis of 
possible threats to information security, the identification of actual threats, the imple-
mentation of a protective measures system in the form of an integrated information 
security system (IISS) under conditions of optimal allocation of investments. 
As noted above, the attacker can invest significant funds in organizing and con-
ducting an attack, comparable in magnitude to the value of 𝑞, but as a rule the allocat-
ed attack potential does not exceed the limits of economic feasibility. However, in the 
case 𝜇 >> 1, i.e. with a significant asymmetry in the perception of the value of infor-
mation by the attacker and defender, a situation arises that can be defined as a long-
term targeted attack. At the same time, the attacking side, which has previously allo-
cated hefty resources for preparing the attack, but has not yet achieved success, 
switches to wait-and-see tactics, accompanied by constant monitoring of the quality 
of the functioning of the attacked organization ISS. Sooner or later, in the event of a 
local decrease in the level of its security (the appearance of even a short-term vulner-
ability), the attacker carries out a successful attack. In this case, the attacker's main 
expendable resource is his time and the costs of monitoring the security status of the 
attack object. 
From the formal point of view, if 𝜇 ≠ 1, when  𝑔 → ∞ the probability of the threat 
activation is 𝑃𝑡 → 1, i.e. the threat exists constantly and its implementation will occur 
as soon as the opportunity presents itself. If there is an insider in the attacked organi-
zation, he can report the onset of this moment or try to create it. This moment will 
correspond to a local burst of probability 𝑃𝑣, which, according to the definition intro-
duced in [11], is a “terminal” probability, the value of which changes over time in 
accordance with the chosen attack tactics. In this case defensive side should choice a 
strategy of so-called proactive defense, based on the research of the behavior, tactics 
and strategy of the attacking side, i.e. used the approaches and principles of reflexive 
control [19]. Proactive defense strategy allows defensive side to postpone the onset of 
the moment of successful implementation of the threat theoretically for an unlimited 
period of time. 
Thus, the IISS, built only in accordance with the requirements of the current regu-
latory documents of the ISS system, does not provide sufficient guarantees of protec-
tion against attacks in cyberspace implemented today: targeted advanced persistent 
threats, advanced evasion techniques. The complexes of protective measures used 
today are young effective against these threats. In this regard, the development of 
proactive defense systems using the approaches and principles of reflexive control is 
promising. 
 
4.3 Specification 3. Hired professional executor 
The attacker, in order to achieve his goals, resorts to the services of a hired contractor 
who is obliged to do his job under any circumstances. In particular, if his task is to 
implement any information threat, the professional executor immediately proceeds 
directly to the search and exploitation of the vulnerability of the organization's IS, i.e. 
it is obvious that in this situation 𝑃𝑡 = 1.  
In the previous specifications the attacking side in its actions is guided by the prin-
ciple of economic expediency (reasonable sufficiency).  
Unlike them, a feature of specification 3 is that due to the special importance of the 
task assigned to the professional executor, resource constraints are removed and, 
moreover, he can count on attracting various additional resources to support his ac-
tions: financial, technical, operational as well as information and analytical etc.  
In practice this means the possibility of implementing very high-cost attacks 
(D → ∞) within the framework of Specification 3. A typical example of such situation 
is the implementation of a particularly important task by an undercover man who is a 
professional trained to carry out attacking actions in cyberspace [15; 19]. 
The reflexive risk model for this case is simple: 
 






It is obvious that with the removal of resource constraints (𝐷 → ∞) the probability 
𝑃𝑣 → 1, i.e. the successful implementation of the threat by the attacker is practically 
guaranteed and, as a result, 𝑅(𝑐) → 𝑞. This is achieved through the implementation 
by the attacker of new original attacks, protection from which is almost impossible to 
envisage within the framework of the standard RBA methodology presented in the 
current risk management guides, based on the research and analysis of previous secu-
rity incidents. 
 
4.4 Specification 4. Hacktivist 
The attacker is an ideological hacker who use computer systems for a politically or 
socially motivated purpose [16; 17; 19]. 
He seeks to transfer the promotion of political or social ideas (often of a rather du-
bious nature) to cyberspace, organizes actions of civil "electronic" disobedience in 
cyberspace, trying to attract the attention of the authorities and the public (sometimes 
in a rather tough form) to certain issues and problems of modern society through the 
synthesis of social activity and hacking. The most typical hacktivists actions are web-
site defacement and computer hacking, in particular denial-of-service attacks, e-mail 
bombing as well as computer viruses and worms. 
There is practically no commercial component in the actions of a hacktivist, his at-
tack potential, in particular resource provision, is usually limited, therefore Specifica-
tion 4, depending on the resources available to the hacktivist, may be close to Specifi-
cation 1 or 2. Having established that the hacktivist belongs to a particular protest 
community, it is possible with a high degree of probability to assume the type, dura-
tion, mass, intensity and possible consequences of hacker attacks. Therefore, the use 
of ROA in such situations can be quite effective. 
5 Conclusions 
The analysis of reflexive risk models shows that they are focused on a certain set of 
attacker properties, which forms specific aspects of its behavior, the social and psy-
chological features and target settings of its actions, which largely affect the choice of 
the attacking strategy, and methods of threats implementing. Each of these models 
can be tailored to its own security policy to minimize losses to the organization. De-
velopment of these security policies determines the content of an adaptive approach to 
managing the information security process in an organization. At the same time, 
"adaptive management" [19] refers to the process of applying a targeted choice, and, 
if necessary, changing the parameters and structure of the organization's ISS in order 
to make adequate decisions to ensure the required level of protection of its infor-
mation resource from attacking actions of an intruder, harmonizing the financial and 
economic capabilities of the organization with its requirements and opportunities in 
the field of information security, ensuring effective and rational investment in the 
organization's information security system. 
The study of reflexive risk models, reflecting for a number of typical "attack-
defense" situations the characteristic features of the behavior and actions of the at-
tacker, presented in the Specifications 1, 2 and, 4 (script kiddie, professional hacker, 
hacktivist), makes it possible to analyze high-level risks, predict estimates of the mar-
ginal volume of investments in the organization's information security, prioritize risks 
and identify a group of relevant information threats, thereby ensuring an effective 
distribution of funds invested in the organization’s information security. 
An analysis of the application of RBA to building an organization's information se-
curity system using the risk model defined in the Specification 2 (Professional hacker) 
for long-term targeted attacks leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to provide 
sufficient guarantees of protection against a number of attacks, implemented in cyber-
space. 
Considering that the basic methodology of RBA, presented in the information se-
curity risk management standards, is based on the research and analysis of previous 
security incidents, the successful use of RBA to build an effective information securi-
ty system that allows reflecting new, unpredictable attack history is not possible.  In 
this regard, the use of RBA for building an information security system against hired 
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